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NOTES
The Rome Convention and the German
Paradigm: Forecasting the Demise of
the European Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations
H. Matthew Horlacher*
Introduction
On April 1, 1991, the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations,' commonly known as the 1980 Rome Convention, came into
force. 2 Its purpose is to establish uniform European Community conflict
of laws rules for contractual obligations. 3 This European Community
(E.C.) agreement has generated a great deal of controversy both within
and without the Community. These controversies include, among other
things, the necessity and desirability of such a Convention; the Conven-
tion's effect on international law, E.C. law and domestic law; and the Con-
* LL.M. Candidate, 1995, Heidelberg University (Germany); J.D., 1994, Cornell
Law School; B., 1991, Brigham Young University.
1. 1980 O.J. (L 266) [hereinafter Rome Convention].
2. EC: Rome Convention Related to Contractual Obligations Ratified, Reuter Textilne
Agence Europe, Mar. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Arcnws File.
3. The preamble to the Convention reads:
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community,
ANXIOUS to continue in the field of private international law the work of unifi-
cation of law which has already been done within the Community in particular
in the field of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments,
WISHING to establish uniform rules concerning the law applicable to contrac-
tual obligations,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: ....
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173 (1994)
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vention's impact on the international commercial community.4
Part I of this Note traces the history, purposes, and structure of the
Rome Convention, paying special attention to the history of the Conven-
tion in, and its relation to, Germany. Part II identifies beneficial Conven-
tion provisions, but Part III argues that the Rome Convention is a flawed
document that aims for lofty goals through ineffective means, and that the
commotion caused by the Rome Convention is therefore both unneces-
sary and unwarranted. Part IV utilizes the incorporation of the Rome
Convention into the German Civil Code as a model for forecasting the
Rome Convention's ineffectiveness in the European Community. Part V
proposes modifications designed to strengthen Convention provisions and
to help achieve its stated goals through alternative means. This Note con-
cludes that, in its present form, the Rome Convention is destined to fail.
I. Background
A. History and Purpose of the Convention
1. Inception
On September 8, 1967, the governments of the Benelux countries5 sub-
mitted a proposal to the Commission of the European Communities to
consider the unification of private international law and the codification
of rules concerning the conflict of laws within the European Community.6
The Commission subsequently formed the "Brussels Working Group" to
investigate the proposal. In his opening address, Mr. T. Vogelaar, chair-
man of the Group, stated the Group's goals:
This proposal should bring about a complete unification of the rules of
conflict.... The great advantage of this proposal is undoubtedly that the
level of legal certainty would be raised, confidence in the stability of legal
relationships fortified, agreements on jurisdiction according to the applica-
ble law facilitated, and the protection of rights acquired over the whole field
of private law augmented.?
Although several articles in the Treaty of Rome declared as an objective
the desire to raise legal certainty, the proposed harmonization was not
specifically linked to the Treaty of Rome,8 the European Community
founding document.9 The Group, nevertheless, unanimously agreed that
the legal basis of their project was to "be a natural sequel to the [Brussels]
Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement ofjudgments." 10
Rome Convention, supra note 1.
4. See G.W. Hogan, Contracting Out of the Rome Convention, 108 Lw Q REv. 12
(1992).
5. The Benelux countries include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
6. 1980 O.J. (C 282) 1.
7. Id. at 4.
8. TRFArv ESrABLsING THE EURoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TRaATY].
9. E.g., arts. 220 and 100.
10. 1980 O.J. (C 282) 5.
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The Brussels Convention1 both limited and eliminated restrictions
on the enforcement of judgments within the European Community. It
also created new opportunities to bring suit in alternative forums.1 2 The
Rome Convention was developed largely as a response to the "forum shop-
ping" possibilities created by the Brussels Convention.1 3 If uniform rules
exist, it was reasoned, the motive to forum shop disappears because no
advantage is gained by bringing suit in one forum over another.
2. Development
The Commission realized that legal certainty is optimally attained when
Member States unify substantive laws rather than choice-of-law rules. The
Commission also realized, however, that attempting such a task would be
difficult, time consuming, and impractical.'
4
After considering the various fields of conflict laws, the Group chose
to limit their work to the law of obligations, both contractual and non-
contractual. In 1972, the Group completed a draft of their proposals15
and submitted it to the Member States for consideration. These proposals
formed the basis of the ensuing E.E.C. Preliminary Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations.'
6
In 1978, the Group decided to further restrict the scope of their task
by eliminating non-contractual obligations from their consideration, thus
resulting in a Convention on the law applicable only to contractual obliga-
tions. This structural change came largely as a result of the accession to
the European Community of three new Member States: Denmark, Ire-
land, and the United Kingdom. The British delegation specifically
requested that the non-contractual provisions be severed from the agree-
ment and considered separately in a subsequent convention.
1 7
3. Ratification
The Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
was completed in February 1979 and submitted to Member States for com-
11. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments,
1978 O.J. (L 304) 77 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
12. See DicEy & MoRRIS ON THE CoNmLcr OF L ws 264-78 (Lawrence Collins et al.
eds., l1th ed. 1987).
13. Article 5 of the Brussels Convention allows concurrent jurisdiction over the
same matter. This invites parties to "forum shop" for the most favorable law. Eric
Jayme, The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980), in
INTERNATiONAL CONTRACTS AND CONFICrS OF LAws: A CoILIcrION OF EssAYs 36, 38
(Peter gar~evi6 ed., 1990).
14. Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, Council Report on the Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, O.J. (C 282) 1, 4 [hereinafter Convention
Report].
15. The EEC Draft of a Convention Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obliga-
tions, 21 AM.J. CoMP. L 584 (1973).
16. Patrick Ross Williams, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 35 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1, 3 (1986).
17. Paul Lagarde, The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions: An Apologia, 22 VA.J. INTL L. 91, 92 (1981).
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ment.18 Following submission of comments, a new working group was
formed to finalize the agreement. Part of the group's task was determin-
ing the scope of European Court of Justice (E.CJ.) jurisdiction in inter-
preting the Convention. 19
A general agreement concerning the substantive provisions of the
agreement was reached fairly quickly. The major disagreements arose
over jurisdictional questions and the number of Member States required
for Convention ratification and implementation. 20 The Ministers of Jus-
tice held a special Council in Rome on June 19, 1980, to address these
concerns. Member States subsequently agreed to fix the number required
for ratification of the Convention at seven.2 1 Member States temporarily
deferred the question of E.CJ. interpretation and, instead, declared them-
selves prospectively ready "to examine the possibility of conferring jurisdic-
tion in certain matters on the [E.CJ.] and, if necessary, to negotiate an
agreement to this effect."
22
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
was opened for signature on June 19, 1980,23 and nine Member States
signed on to the Convention.24 The seven State ratification requirement
was eventually fulfilled by the United Kingdom, and the Convention offi-
cially came into being on April 1, 1991. Spain and Portugal have subse-
quently signed,25 leaving Greece as the only E.C. Member yet to ratify the
Convention.
B. Structure and Scope of the Convention
The Rome Convention has a broad scope with universal application. Arti-
cle 1(1) states: "The rules of this Convention shall apply to contractual
obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of differ-
ent countries." Article 2 adds: "Any law specified by this Convention shall
be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting State."
The Rome Convention, unlike the Brussels Convention,2 6 is applica-
ble to all contracts, not just contracts between Member States. The Con-
vention therefore applies to non-Member State parties when a choice-of-
law dispute comes before a Member State's court. For example, if a U.S.
18. Williams, supra note 16, at 4.
19. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 8.
22. 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 6348 (1980).
23. Rome Convention, supra note 1.
24. These states were Belgium, France, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands. EC: Rome Convention Related to Contrac-
tual Obligations Ratfied, Reuter Textline, Agence Europe, Mar. 28, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Arcnws File.
25. Justice CounciL" Rome Convention Signed, European Information Service, Euro-
pean Report, June 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File.
26. The applicability of the Brussels Convention when a non-contracting State is
involved is the underlying issue in ReHarrods Buenos Aires, [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 (Eng.
CA.), a case currently before the European Court of Justice. See Richard Fentiman,
Jurisdiction, Discretion and the Brussels Convention, 26 CoREL. INr'L LJ. 59 (1993).
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corporation and an Australian client form a contract with an English juris-
dictional clause, or if an English court otherwise obtains jurisdiction over
their contractual obligation, the English court must abide by the precepts
of the Rome Convention when resolving any dispute concerning the par-
ties' choice of applicable law.
Despite the broad scope of the Rome Convention, a number of cate-
gories are excluded in articles 1(2) and 1(3). These include contractual
obligations relating to wills and succession, duties arising out of family
relationships, and obligations arising from promissory notes and other
such instruments. There were three primary reasons for these exclusions.
First, international conventions already existed which encompassed the
excluded subject matter. 27 Second, the exclusions fell within areas consti-
tuting the exercise of State authority, an area not within the scope of the
European Community. Third, instruments pertaining more directly to the
excluded subject matter were either being prepared or were already in
force.2 8
C. Uniform Rules
1. Party Autonomy
Article 3 is a very liberal provision which gives multinational parties the
freedom and ability to specify any law they wish to govern the contract.
Article 3(1) reads:
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice
must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms
of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties
can select the law applicable to the whole or a part of the contract. 2
9
In addition, article 3(2) allows parties to choose the applicable law after
the contract has been formed. 0 This provision, unlike analogous provi-
sions in other countries, 1 contains no reasonable connection test. Parties
may therefore choose a governing law that has no reasonable connection
to the parties or the contract.
Although choice of law is unlimited, article 3 does not allow the par-
ties to escape a country's mandatory rules if "all the other elements rele-
vant to the situation are connected to one country only."32 Thus, two
English parties forming a domestic contract may not circumvent an Eng-
lish mandatory rule by choosing French law to govern the contract. In this
27. E.g., infra note 79.
28. S. Hadley Ruston &John H. Works, Jr., Thie European Convention on Contractual
Obligations, 10J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 165, 165 (1980).
29. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
30. Id.
31. For example, the U.S. Restatement voids choice of law provisions if "the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no
other reasonable basis for the parties' choice .... " RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
rucr OF LAws § 187(2) (a) (1971).
32. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
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sense, the Rome Convention also governs, or provides parameters for,
domestic contracts.
If a choice of law is not express, article 3 allows a choice to be inferred
from the circumstances of the case or from the contract's terms, so long as
the choice is "demonstrated with reasonable certainty."3 3 Where the par-
ties had no clear intention of making such a choice, the court is not
allowed to infer one.m
Article 3 also allows parties to subject different parts of a contract to
different law.3 5 This practice is commonly referred to as d6pegage.3 6
Thus, parties can partition a contract according to the issues being gov-
erned and apply a separate and distinct law to each of those issues. This
provision was included as an extension of party autonomy.3 7
A choice of law meets the requirements of article 3 only if it is
"express" or "demonstrated with reasonable certainty." Otherwise, the
judge refers to article 4 to determine the applicable law.
2. Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice
The general rule of article 4 is: where parties to a contract have failed to
specify a governing law, the law of the country most closely connected to
the agreement will govern. Article 4(1) reads:
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in
accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the
country with which it is most closely connected. Nevertheless, a severable
part of the contract which has a closer connection with another country
may by way of exception be governed by the law of that other country.3 8
D~pecage is also allowed under article 4. Thus, if a contract fails to specify
a governing law, and separate parts of that contract have closer connec-
tions to different countries, each of those country's laws may be applied to
their respective parts.
In determining the "closest connection," article 4(2) furnishes a pre-
sumption to guide a judge: the habitual residence of the party effecting
the characteristic performance3 9 of the contract will determine the place
of closest connection. This presumption does not apply, however, if the
characteristic performance cannot be determined. Also, exceptions to
this presumption are made for rights concerning immovable property and
33. Id. art. 3(1).
34. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 17.
35. Article 3(1) (third sentence) reads: "By their choice the parties can select the
law applicable to the whole or apart only of the contract." Rome Convention, supra note
1 (emphasis added).
36. Dxc-y & MoRRIs ON THE CoNucr OF Lws, supra note 12, at 44.
37. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 17.
38. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
39. Characteristic performance is not defined in the Rome Convention, presumably
leaving the definition to a judge's discretion. For an analysis of characteristic perform-
ance, see Kurt Lipstein, CharacteristicPeformance-A New Concept in the Conflict of Laws in
Matters of Contractfor the EEC; 3 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 402 (1981).
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for contracts concerning the carriage of goods.4°
3. Mandatoy Rules
The Rome Convention includes certain "mandatory" provisions: rules
considered fundamental enough to require all parties to abide by them.
Article 3(3),41 which compels application of a country's mandatory rules
where "all other elements"42 except for the chosen law are connected to
that country, exemplifies such a mandatory provision. Convention provi-
sions that regulate party autonomy, however, are the exception rather
than the general rule.
Articles 5 and 6 resulted from the drafters' concern that traditionally
weaker parties be protected against adverse choice of law clauses.43 Arti-
cle 5 governs choice of law for consumer contracts.44 The drafters of the
Convention considered buyers the traditionally weaker party45 and drafted
a provision to give consumers the protection afforded by the mandatory
rules of their habitual residence. Article 6, like article 5, affords employ-
ees, another traditionally weaker party, the mandatory protection of their
habitual residence. Both articles 5 and 6 grant parties the freedom of
choice to apply applicable law. These articles are safety provisions,
included for the benefit of traditionally weaker parties, should the tradi-
tionally stronger party attempt to manipulate choice of law provisions to
the stronger party's advantage.
Article 7 compels the application of another country's mandatory
rules, other than those of the elected country, where that country has a
close connection to the contract. 46 The necessity of article 7 may appear
questionable in light of article 3(3), which already contains provisions for
applying mandatory rules of a State not governing the contract. The dis-
tinction is that article 3(3) requires "all" elements, other than the choice
of law clause, to be connected to a State before its mandatory rules are
applicable. Article 7, on the other hand, requires only a "close connec-
tion" for such application. The rationale of article 7 lies in an interests
analysis; if a State has a strong enough interest in a contract, application of
40. Rome Convention, supra note 1, arts. 4(3), 4(4).
41. See supra text accompanying note 32.
42. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
43. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 23.
44. Article 5(2) reads: "Notwithstanding the provisions of article 3, a choice of law
made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protec-
tion afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the country in which he has his habitual
residence .... " Rome Convention, supra note 1.
45. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 23.
46. Article 7(1) reads:
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given
to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation
has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country,
those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In con-
sidering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to
their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application.
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its laws is compelled, regardless of the governing law.47
4. Validity
Article 8 provides that the law determining the material validity of a con-
tract shall be the same law which would govern if the contract were valid. 48
For example, assume a Danish party contracts with a Belgian party, and
English law is chosen to govern their contract. If either party brings an
action challenging that contract's validity, a court would look to English
law, not Danish or Belgian law, for rules governing the validity of
contracts.
Article 9 governs determination of the formal validity of a contract. 49
Although formal validity is not defined in the Rome Convention, it is gen-
erally understood to refer to matters such as the requirements that a con-
tract be notarized, in writing, or registered with a government office.50
Formal validity is determined either by the law applied in the contract or
by the law of the place where the contract was concluded. This choice
illustrates the principle of favor negotii, which holds that the rule in favor of
validating the contract shall apply.5 ' Consequently, situations in which a
contract may be rescinded due to formal invalidity are greatly reduced.
5. Other Significant Provisions
Article 15 excludes the application of renvoi, a doctrine which allows a
court to adopt a foreign country's conflict of laws rules, instead of its own,
in determining proper law.5 2 A court will often use renvoi to refer back to
its own forum law.53 For example, if a German and a French company
form a contract with a U.S. choice of law clause, or even if the contract
simply has a close connection to the United States, a Member State's court
is forbidden to apply U.S. conflict of laws rules to determine the governing
law, regardless of the forum determined by U.S. rules.
Article 16 reserves the right of a forum court to refuse application of a
rule of law, as directed by the Rome Convention, if doing so would be
"manifestly incompatible" with its public policy.54 Included in these policy
considerations is "Community public policy."55
Article 18 petitions courts to consider uniformity concerns when
interpreting and applying Convention provisions. This article states: "In
the interpretation and application of the preceding uniform rules, regard
shall be had to their international character and to the desirability of
Rome Convention, supra note 1.
47. Williams, supra note 16, at 22.
48. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 8.
49. Id.
50. Williams, supra note 16, at 19.
51. Jayme, supra note 13, at 45.
52. BLAci's LAW DianoNARY 1298 (6th ed. 1990).
53. Id.
54. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 16.
55. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 38.
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achieving uniformity in their interpretation and application."56
The Rome Convention contains a total of 33 articles, a relatively short
document considering the broad spectrum it attempts to encompass.
Although the Convention is not overburdened with technical details and
complex provisions, its ecumenical structure is also its principal flaw.
D. The Rome Convention and the German Civil Code
Although Germany is home to some of the most renowned scholars on
conflict of laws,57 the German Civil Code contained no conflict of laws
rules until only recently.58 Earlier German conflicts rules were developed
largely in a case-by-case, common-law manner, a concept foreign to the
German legal system.59 This was apparently a principal catalyst in the
decision of the German legislature to incorporate the Rome Convention
into German law on September 1, 1986.60
Rather than incorporating the Convention as a statutory appendix to
the Civil Code,61 Germany chose instead to assimilate the Convention62
into the Introductory Law of the German Code (E.G.B.G.B.). 63 In so
doing, Germany acted contrary to the advice of many experts64 and the
E.C. Commission.65 These experts maintained that Germany's alteration
of the original Convention, which included adjusting Convention wording
to German legal terminology,66 deleting certain Convention provisions,
and dividing the Convention into different parts, undermined the uni-
formity which the Convention strove to achieve.67
Despite these criticisms, at least one commentator believed that arti-
cle 36 of the E.G.B.G.B., the German incorporation of the Convention's
56. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 18.
57. These German scholars include Frederic Karl von Savigny and Otto von Gieke.
58. Volker Triebel, The Choice of Law in Commercial Relations: A German Perspectiv 37
INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 935, 93536 (1988).
59. Id. at 936.
60. Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Internationalen Privatrechts vom 25. Juli 1986,
BGB1. 1, 1142 (1986).
61. In 1984, Denmark incorporated the Rome Convention into its domestic law in
this manner. Ole Lando, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions, 24 COMMON MiT. L. REV. 159, 162 (1987).
62. Id.
63. Einfrihrungs Gesetz zum Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch. For a text of the Conven-
tion provisions following their incorporation into the German Code, see 50 RABELs
ZErrscmuFr FOR AusLh Nms-s uND INTENAnoNALEs PRIVATRECHT [RABsaSZ] 673-78
(1986).
64. Stellungnahme des Max-Planck-Instituts fir Ausldndisches und Internationales Pfiva-
trecht zum Regierungsentwurf von 1983, 47 RAasZ 595 (1983); Bernd von Hoffman,
Empfiehlt es sich das LMereinkommen tiber das auf vertragliche Schuldverhtltnisse anzuwendende
Recht in das deutsche IPR-Gesetz zu inkorporieren?, 4 PRAMs DES INTERNAIONALEN PRIVAT-
utrn VERFAHRENREcHs [IPRAx] 10 (1984). For a general discussion of the problems
associated with the changes to the Einffihrungsgesetz, see Wilhelm Wengler, Zur
Technik der internationalprivatrechtlichen Rechtsanwendungsanweisungen des lPR-Reform
gesetztes von 1986, 53 RABmZ 409 (1989).
65. Recommendation ofJan. 15, 1985, 5 IPRAx 178 (1985).
66. Triebel, supra note 58, at 936.
67. Lando, supra note 61, at 162-63.
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article 18,6 could neutralize both the negative effects and the advantages
of Convention integration.69 This Convention article "makes no mention
of an option available to the German judge, rather it imposes the duty to
proceed, in case of doubt, as if the Convention were authoritative in Ger-
many."70 A German judge is accordingly bound to interpret the provision
with regard to "the desirability of achieving uniformity... ." 71 Theoreti-
cally, therefore, Convention adoption in Germany will bear uniform
results despite the alteration of some provisions.72
II. Beneficial Provisions
The Convention drafters' first commendable act was to exclude non-con-
tractual obligations. The Convention's present scope is already very
broad, and including non-contractual obligations would only have further
diluted an already weak agreement. The British delegation recognized
this weakness and convinced other Member States to further limit the
agreement's scope.
The drafters also properly excluded matters covered under other
international conventions in article 1(2) and article 21.73 Those conven-
tions were designed to govern specific matters in specialized areas and
were drafted by authorities in the respective fields. The drafters wisely
chose to defer to the experts' acumen and to the stability that many of
these conventions already had achieved.
Articles 5 and 6 are beneficial provisions because they recognize the
need to provide traditionally weaker parties with the protection afforded
them by the laws of their habitual residence. Including such provisions in
international agreements is relatively innovative, and their inclusion in the
Rome Convention is a constructive sign for labor and consumer
advocates. 74
Another benefit, which is not so obvious, is the process involved in
forming the Rome Convention. If a true "community" is the ultimate goal
of the Europeans, an act which facilitates Community interaction is highly
desirable. The process of bringing together distinguished jurists from
throughout the European Community to forge agreements should pro-
vide an improved environment for future conventions and other attempts
at further cooperation and understanding.
68. For the text of article 18, see supra text accompanying note 56.
69. Abbo Junker, Die einheitliche europ"dische Auslegung nach dem EG-Schuldvertragsber-
einkommen, 55 RA.sisZ 674, 696 (1991).
70. Id.
71. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 18.
72. Junker maintains, however, that a truly uniform interpretation of the Rome
Convention will never occur until the European Court of Justice has sole jurisdiction
over such matters. Junker, supra note 69, at 696.
73. Article 1(2) excludes specific areas such as wills and succession. Article 21
excludes conventions not included in article 1 (2) and future conventions. See infra text
accompanying notes 78-85.
74. See C.G.J. Morse, Consumer Contracts, Employment Contracts and the Rome Conven-
tion, 41 INTr'L & Comr. L.Q. 1 (1992).
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M. Deficiencies
A. Scope
1. Universality
The Rome Convention is an endeavor of the European Community. As
such, only Community members were involved in its formation. The Con-
vention, however, is intended to have universal scope; by its terms, the
Convention applies to all contracts, not just to contracts between Member
States. For example, article 2 states: "Any law specified by this Convention
shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting State."75 This
raises a question: why were non-Member States not given the opportunity
to participate in the development of the Convention since it was apparent
they were to be affected by it? Such an approach would have been compa-
rable to the approach taken in the formation of other international Con-
ventions, such as the Geneva Conventions. 76
The probable but unstated response to this proposition is that such
broad participation would have been unproductive, increasing only the
amount of time necessary to complete the agreement,77 not to mention
the decreased likelihood that additional states would agree to such an
arrangement. Yet a broader participation might have prompted Conven-
tion drafters to scale down the scope of their plans. This was illustrated
with the entry of Great Britain into the Community which, after entering
Convention negotiations, ultimately persuaded Member States to reduce
the Convention's scope. Wider international community involvement
might have resulted in a narrower, better drafted Convention, or a series
of narrow and specific Conventions; either result would be more effective
than the existing Convention. The Convention admittedly establishes
some limitations to its scope. These provisions, however, are defective and
leave sizable gaps in the Convention.
2. Restrictive Measures
Article 1(2) excludes from the Rome Convention issues covered by other
international conventions. Such provisions are desirable,7 8 but only when
properly drafted. Although the Convention apportions previously
addressed topics to their respective agreements, it fails to provide direc-
tion to Member States who are not parties to these excluded conventions.
Ironically, the Convention thereby effectively forces these Member States
to refer back to their original conflicts rules, the same rules that the Con-
vention seeks to eliminate.
An example helps illustrate this Convention loophole. Article 1(2) (c)
excludes obligations arising under bills of exchange, cheques and promis-
sory notes, and other negotiable instruments. This exception arose due to
75. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
76. E.g., infra note 79.
77. For example, the amount of time needed to accomplish this task among Mem-
ber States-from conceptualization to ratification-was almost fourteen years.
78. See supra text accompanying note 73.
Cornell International Law Journal
two existing Geneva Conventions 79 governing these areas.80 Ireland and
Great Britain, however, are not members of these two Conventions. Thus,
when an Irish judge faces an obligation arising under a promissory note, a
category excluded from the Rome Convention, the judge must resort to
Irish conflicts rules to resolve this dispute, instead of looking to the Con-
vention for assistance. This loophole and others result in a deficient Con-
vention, leaving voids in many important areas of conflict law.81
Article 21, another provision that limits the Convention's scope,
states: "This Convention shall not prejudice the application of interna-
tional conventions to which a Contracting State is, or becomes, a party."8 2
The repercussions of this provision could be devastating to the Conven-
tion because it establishes the Rome Convention's subordination to other
international conventions. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable
to International Sales of Goods83 is such a convention. States that are
members of both the Hague Convention and the Rome Convention face a
dilemma when the two conventions overlap.8 4 The Hague Convention,
like the Rome Convention, contains provisions for ascertaining the appli-
cable law for a sale-of-goods contract where the parties have neglected to
designate such law. According to article 21 of the Rome Convention,
Member States subscribing to the Hague Sale of Goods Convention85
should continue to apply its choice of law rules instead of those advanced
by the Rome Convention. By allowing the Hague Convention to dictate
choice of law for its Member States but not for non-Member States, the
Rome Convention directly undermines its original purpose-to provide
uniform choice of law rules.
B. Structure
1. Certainty Versus Flexibility
The structure of the Rome Convention is comparable to the structure of
many of the world's conflicts systems.8 6 The Convention's provisions
attempt to delineate system selecting rules, with result de-selection on pub-
79. The Geneva Convention on the Law Applicable to Bills of Exchange and Prom-
issory NotesJune 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 257; The Geneva Convention on the Law Appli-
cable to Cheques, Mar. 19, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 355.
80. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 11.
81. Georges R. Delaume, The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations: Why a Convention?, 22 VA..J. INT'L L. 105, 106 (1981).
82. Rome Convention, supra note 1.
83. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of GoodsJune
15, 1955, 910 U.N.T.8. 147 [hereinafter Hague Sale of Goods Convention].
84. See RicHARD PLE:NDER, THE EuoPF.AN CoNTRACrS CONVEanON: THE ROME CON-
VE ON ON TIE CaoicE OF LAW FOR CONTRACrS 16-17 (1991).
85. These states are Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Peter Winship, Private International Law and the U.N. Sales Convention, 21 CoRNELL. INT'L
L.J. 487, 490 n.14 (1988).
86. See generally PLENDFR, supra note 84, at 87-102 (discussing, for example, the con-
flict of laws system in Australia, Great Britain, and France).
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lic policy grounds.87 In other words, the rules of the Rome Convention
first designate the proper governing forum and then prescribe exceptions
to that forum which are typically based on fairness or other public policy
concerns.
When developing such a system, the mutually exclusive objectives of
flexibility and certainty must be balanced against each other; flexibility is
attained only at the expense of certainty and vice versa. A principal flaw of
Convention articles is their heavy tilt towards flexibility, thereby leaving
certainty to suffer. The majority of Convention articles exhibit the follow-
ing structure: a maxim is stated in an introductory provision of the rule
and then undermined in a succeeding provision. The subsequent provi-
sion is not intended to frustrate the original rule, but rather to provide
needed policy exceptions. While exceptions are necessary, it is neverthe-
less possible to structure them narrowly with strict operational guidelines.
Unfortunately, exceptions in the Rome Convention are left largely to the
decision-maker's discretion. The net result is a very flexible document
which provides almost no certainty.
2. Vagueness
The vagueness of the Convention's articles demonstrates their inclination
towards flexibility. However, such vagueness "reduces [the Convention] to
a restatement of broad principles. As such, it is incapable of providing
effective guidance either to the judge faced with problems of conflict solu-
tion or to the draftsman of a contract engaged in techniques of conflict
avoidance." 88 An analysis of the most important Convention articles illus-
trates the numerous problems generated by such equivocal and indetermi-
nate provisions.
The Convention's opening provision, article 1 (1), states: "The rules
of this Convention shall apply to contractual obligations . . 89 Since the
legal standards for a contract differ from State to State, the question neces-
sarily arises as to what constitutes a contractual obligation under the
Convention.
Article 10(1) includes provisions that attempt to define the scope of
contract law for Convention purposes, but the list is far from comprehen-
sive9 ° and fails to explicitly define a contractual obligation. The history
and structure of article 10 reveal that this ambiguity was intentional. The
Convention Report, for example, shows that the drafters deliberately
avoided defining the "manner of performance" standard in article
10(2). 9 1 Even the very structure of article 10 acknowledges the existence
87. Concept borrowed from a lecture by Professor Richard Fentiman given at Cor-
nel Law School, Sept. 22, 1992.
88. Delaume, supra note 81, at 107.
89. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
90. For example, article 10 does not indicate whether the Convention covers quasi-
contractual obligations.
91. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 33.
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of issues outside its scope. 92
Convention drafters understood that the interpretation and determi-
nation of such issues would necessarily fall to the judges applying the lex
forL93 Instead of providing a uniform application standard among all
Member States, however, the Convention's purposes were once again frus-
trated by acquiescing to flexibility concerns.
Article 3, an integral Convention provision, also falls victim to the
nebulous construction which plagues so many articles. Where the parties'
choice of law is not express, article 3 requires that their intent be demon-
strated with "reasonable certainty." The Convention does not, however,
define the reasonable certainty standard. The result is an article-origi-
nally intended to guide a judge in determining the intention of the par-
ties-that provides essentially no guidance. Without the restraints of a
narrow definition, judges are left to their complete and unfettered discre-
tion.94 For all practical purposes,judges will probably rely on methods or
standards with which they are familiar-the standards of theirjurisdiction.
Thus is illustrated why the Convention is often its own worst enemy.
3. Ex Post Facto Choice of Law
Article 3(2) allows parties to agree on a law after a contract has been con-
cluded. Although a very flexible provision, this article is essentially a loop-
hole that encourages litigation. Circumstances calling for the application
of this article will typically only arise if one party is disadvantaged by the
application of article 4,95 the article governing the determination of appli-
cable law in the absence of a choice of law. In other words, the party
disadvantaged by article 4 will wish to choose a different law according to
article 3(2), while the advantaged party will contend that article 4 should
govern. Suppose, for example, that a dispute arises between a French and
a Danish party over a contract with no choice-of-law clause, and article 4
dictates that Danish law should govern because Denmark is the place of
the characteristic performance. Instead of the analysis ending there, arti-
cle 3(2) allows the French party to protract the dispute by pressing for an
ex post facto choice of French law.
4. Dperage
Articles 3 and 4 permit d6pegage, the application of a different governing
law to separate parts of a contract, despite the experience of other coun-
tries showing that such provisions create uncertainty.96 The Convention
Report indicates that many delegates were opposed to any mention of
92. "[T]he words 'in particular' indicate that [article 10(1)] is not exhaustive."
Delaume, supra note 81, at 111.
93. The law of the forum. Id.
94. Delaume suggests that this is nothing more than a manipulation of the connect-
ing factors standard by Convention drafters. Id. at 107.
95. See Williams, supra note 16, at 17.
96. Switzerland and the United States are two of these countries. Lando, supra note
61, at 169.
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d~pegage, but were eventually outvoted.97 This provision was included
despite the infrequency of split contracts in practice.98 Even adamant
Convention proponents admit that this weak provision should be deleted
because of the uncertainty it creates.99
5. Characteristic Performance
Where parties fail to choose a governing law, article 4(1) directs ajudge to
select the law of the forum most closely connected to the contract.100 To
determine the close connection, article 4(2) requires that the "characteris-
tic performance" of the contract first be identified. Once the judge makes
this determination, the judge applies the law of forum where the party
effecting the characteristic performance has its habitual residence.
Evidence of article 4's circular structure arises when "characteristic
performance" becomes undeterminable. In such a scenario, article 4(5)
stipulates that article 4(2) shall not apply. Article 4(5) further directs that
the governing law of the contract shall be determined by the closest con-
nection, which according to article 4(2) cannot be found. Consequently,
a judge referring to article 4 is no better off after applying its provisions
then before. Finding no assistance in the Convention, a forum judge must
once again determine applicable law by referring to any standard the
judge prefers.
6. Closest Connection Standard
Even if a judge can determine characteristic performance, article 4(5)
directs this presumption to be disregarded "if it appears from the circum-
stances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with
another country."' 0 ' This "closest connection standard" is frequently criti-
cized as a directionless requirement which "means nothing except, per-
haps, that the answer is not ready at hand."10 2 Offering this standard, it is
claimed, "is only to state the problem rather than to offer a solution." 08
The Convention provision governing the finding of the close connection
merely states a few presumptions' 0 4 without providing any substantive gui-
97. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 17.
98. Williams, supra note 16, at 12.
99. "Splitting [contracts] should be completely avoided. The harmony between the
obligations of the parties to a bilateral contract is disturbed if different laws are to be
applied to the two obligations." Lando, supra note 61, at 169.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
101. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(5).
102. Ren6 David, The International Unification ofPrivate Law, in2 INTERNATiONAL ENCV-
CLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw: THE LECAL SYSrEMs OF THE WoRLD, THam COMPARMsON
AND UNIFICATION § 5-16 (1971).
103. Friedrich K.Juenger, The Europea Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations: Some Critical Observations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 123, 138 (1981).
104. Article 4(2) states:
[I] t shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the coun-
try where the party who is to effect the performance which is characteristic of
the contract has, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, his habitual
residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporate, its central
administration. However, if the contract is entered into in the course of that
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dance. Without such guidance, judges are once again left only to their
discretion to determine applicable law. Some experts suggest that judges
will determine the closest connection through the common, but outmo-
ded, method of counting relevant connecting factors. 105 This standard
essentially allows a judge to apply any Member State's law, and tojustify it
by reference to the closest connection test. It should therefore be no sur-
prise that article 4 has been called "almost bizarre." 10 6
7. Protection Clauses
While the inclusion of consumer and employee protection clauses in arti-
cles 5 and 6 is commendable, these articles also contain serious flaws.
First, the provisions are not broad enough. There are many other tradi-
tionally weaker parties' 0 7 besides employees and consumers who do not
receive special considerations and who remain vulnerable despite the Con-
vention.1 08 Second, although these regulations grant consumers and
employees the benefit of mandatory rules of their habitual residence,
"mandatory rule" is never defined. This problem is compounded because
the task of determining these laws will always fall to a foreign court. In
other words, the only time articles 5 and 6 apply is when the weaker party
has submitted to a choice of law other than that of its habitual residence.
For example, in a suit between an Italian employer and a Danish
employee, an Italian judge must determine Danish mandatory employ-
ment laws. Since the Convention does not define "mandatory," a judge
has enormous discretion in determining a foreign State's compulsory
rules. The employee, despite article 6, is left in a vulnerable position, in a
foreign forum, with no guarantee of certainty.
8. Interests Analysis
For this European Community agreement to succeed, it must compel
Member States to place Community interests ahead of their own short-
term interests. The interests analysis codified in article 7109 places State
interests ahead of Convention interests by granting application of a Mem-
ber State's laws where that State has a close connection to the contract.
Such a provision is fundamentally inconsistent with the goal of uniform
party's trade or profession, that country shall be the country in which the prin-
cipal place of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract the
performance is to be effected through a place of business other than the princi-
pal place of business, the country in which that other place of business is
situated.
Rome Convention, supra note 1.
105. Delaume, supra note 81, at 109.
106. F.A. Mann, Thelroper Law of the Contract-An Obituay, 107 LAw Q. l._v. 353, 354
(1991).
107. For instance, farmers, small businessmen, and fishermen also may deserve
protection.
108. One commentator suggested that a general distinction between weak and
strong parties should have been created, rather than two piecemeal provisions. See
Lando, supra note 61, at 185.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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and stable rules, and of conflicts avoidance. 110 Article 7 has been called
"the most controversial conflicts rule of the Rome Convention,""' despite
the drafters' contention that it "merely embodies principles which already
exist in the laws of the Member States of the Community.""12
The controversy surrounding article 7 is nevertheless difficult to
understand since the Convention provides several ways to excuse
mandatory rule application. Article 7, like so many other Convention arti-
cles, is governed by a very flexible standard. In determining whether to
exercise a State's mandatory rules, a court is to give due regard to "their
nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application."" l3 One commentator remarked cynically about article 7,
"P.S.: mandatory rules of the forum can be applied at any time, regardless
of anything in the Convention." 114 Likewise, a court can easilyjustify non-
application of mandatory rules.
In addition to the ambiguous standard governing article 7, the Con-
vention also provides an escape clause in article 22(1) (a),"15 giving a State
the right to abstain from applying article 7(1). Germany has already exer-
cised this option,"16 and the United Kingdom has clearly manifested its
intention to do so."17
9. Public Policy
Article 16 is the Convention's public policy exception. It allows a court to
refuse application of the rules of an otherwise applicable law where to do
so would be "manifestly incompatible" with the forum's public policy. Just
what constitutes this public policy is again a matter of discretion. Some
academics contend that the words "manifestly incompatible" indicate that
the rule is only applicable in unique circumstances.' 18 The Convention
fails to make this distinction, however, once again leaving the determina-
tion to forum judges. Article 16 also undermines the certainty of other
Convention articles. For example, a country may use article 16 tojustify its
refusal to apply article 7,119 thus providing another avenue to circumvent
application of this controversial provision.
The Convention is poorly constructed and contains many flaws.
Although some fear that these defects could keep foreigners from submit-
110. Delaume, supra note 81, at 119.
111. Jayme, supra note 13, at 46.
112. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 26.
113. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
114. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Renvoi Among the Law Professors: An American's View of the
European View of American Conflict of Laws, 30 AM.J. Con. L. 99, 106 (1982).
115. "Any Contracting State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or
approval, reserve the right not to apply: the provisions of article 7(1)." Rome Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 22(1) (a).
116. Lando, supra note 61, at 183.
117. Anthony J.E. Jaffey, The English Proper Law Doctrine and the EEC Convention, 33
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 531, 555 (1984).
118. "[WMhere the application of a foreign rule-not the rule itself-would violate
the public policy of the forum." Lando, supra note 61, at 208.
119. Williams, supra note 16, at 27.
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ting their contracts to European law,120 these fears are unfounded. The
defects that these practitioners fear are the same defects which cause the
Convention's ineffectiveness. Some commentators even consider the Con-
vention's indeterminate composition an asset. Professor Russell J. Wein-
traub, a recognized expert in the conflict of laws field, wrote of the
Convention's articles: "[B]etter amorphous rules that permit a wise judge
to reach a proper result than clear and certain rules that compel undesir-
able outcomes."12 1 Professor Weintraub went on to conclude: "When one
considers the functional blindness evidenced by the Convention, its ambi-
guities are its saving grace."122
C. Jurisdiction
Since the Rome Convention is not officially subordinate to the E.C.
Treaty,12 3 the European Court ofJustice is not automatically empowered
with jurisdiction to interpret its provisions, as is the case under the 1968
Brussels Convention. Thus, instead of a unified body giving a single inter-
pretation, Member States are able to construe the Convention as their
judges see fit. This poses a great problem for the Convention because "[i]f
cross-fertilization ofjudicial decision does not happen in the Community
... the hope for unification of law suggested by the attempt to write a
conflict of laws convention will be unfulfilled."1 24
Article 18125 attempts to confront and remedy this situation. It states:
"In the interpretation and application of the preceding uniform rules,
regard shall be had to their international character and to the desirability
of achieving uniformity in their interpretation and application." 126 Article
18 acknowledges the Convention's inability to attain uniformity without an
autonomous E.CJ.jurisdiction. Without a single judicial body to interpret
its provisions, the Convention must appeal to Member States to achieve a
uniform interpretation on their own. The implication, or perhaps hope,
embedded in article 18 is that Community courts will manifest greater def-
erence to fellow Member State decisions than they previously have. This
view, however, is unrealistic given the immense discretion granted to
forum judges.
A number of high ranking judicial officials have already stated their
opposition to the Rome Convention. Lord Wilberforce of the English
House of Lords has criticized the Convention as "unfortunate and unnec-
essary."12 7 He believes "[i]t brings into English law the effect of a Euro-
pean Convention in an area which in English law is perfectly satisfactory,
120. Mann, supra note 106, at 354 (regarding English courts).
121. Russell J. Weintraub, How to Choose Law for Contracts, and How Not to: The EEC
Convention, 17 Tx. INT'L J. 155, 162 (1982).
122. Id.
123. EEC TRATY, supra note 8.
124. Lowenfeld, supra note 114, at 107-08.
125. See supra text accompanying note 56.
126. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 18.
127. 518 PAr- DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 438 (1990), quoted incorrectly in Pippa Rogerson,
The Rome Convention on Contractual Obligations, 141 Naw LJ. 281, 281 (1991).
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has been controlled by the judges and is now to be set into the cement of
statutory legislation."' 28 Such a pre-formed critical attitude towards the
Rome Convention is bound to influence ajudge when interpreting its pro-
visions. One would accordingly expect a Lord Wilberforce to construe the
Convention's provisions to maintain the status quo. The fault for such an
interpretation lies not with Lord Wilberforce, but with the Convention
because it virtually invites such manipulation with its discretionary provi-
sions. Indeed, the Convention's indeterminate provisions force even
impartial judges to resort to pre-Convention techniques.
The European Community has attempted to rectify this situation
through a series of protocols. 12 9 The Member States of the Rome Conven-
tion signed two such protocols on December 19, 1988.130 The stated pur-
pose of these combined protocols is eventually to confer on the European
Court ofJustice the power to interpret the Rome Convention.' 3 ' It is still
unclear whether the Protocols will actually achieve this end.
Seven States must ratify the Protocols before they enter into force.' 3 2
Experience with the Rome Convention shows that this process can, and
often does, take many years to complete. l3 3 While some commentators
believe that ratification of the Protocols is not foreseeable in the near
future,' 3 4 most assume that they will eventually be implemented.'3 5
The Protocols, however, may not necessarily solve the jurisdictional
problem. A Dutch legal expert declared: "Even if the E.E.C. member
states will ratify the First and Second Protocol[s] . . ., the Convention's
wording leaves the construction of most of its key concepts to the discre-
tion of the (national) courts: 'effect may be given,' 'more closely con-
nected,' 'deprives of protection,' etc." i3 6 Ironically, these concepts are
among the Convention's vaguest provisions and, consequently, are provi-
sions whose right of interpretation should be removed from forum courts,
not left to their discretion. Even assuming that the Protocols will solve the
jurisdictional dilemma, there are experts who assert that some countries,
such as the United Kingdom, will nonetheless refuse to submit to such
provisions and will continue to refer interpretation to their own courts.' 3 7
128. Id.
129. First and Second Protocols on the Interpretation by the Court ofJustice of the
European Communities of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obli-
gations, opened for signatureJune 19, 1980, 89/129/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 48) [hereinafter
Convention Protocols].
130. Id.
131. Antonio Tizzano, Council Report on the Protocols on the Interpretation by the
Court of Justice of the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, 1990 O.J. (C 219) 1, 3.
132. Id. at 15.
133. See supra note 77.
134. Lando, supra note 61, at 208.
135. See Rogerson, supra note 127, at 282; Mann, supra note 106, at 354.
136. T.M. de Boer, TheEEC Contracts Convention and the Dutch Courts: A Methodological
Perspective, 54 RABELSZ 24, 62 n.124 (1990).
137. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 106, at 354 (referring specifically to the probability
that the English House of Lords would not refer many Convention matters to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice if this protocol were to be implemented).
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Recent difficulties encountered with European Community proposals'3 8
attest that Member States are increasingly hesitant to relinquish sover-
eignty, and the Protocols are not immune to this fear.
Ifjurisdiction is eventually conferred on the E.CJ., there is no guar-
antee that it would interpret the Convention according to the drafters'
intentions; indeed, there is persuasive evidence to the contrary. In a deci-
sion of January 15, 1987,'3 9 the E.C.J., in its interpretation of article 5(1)
of the Brussels Convention, 140 criticized the characteristic performance
test, a core standard of the Rome Convention. The Court stated, perhaps
discerningly, that such "criterion might.., create uncertainty as to juris-
diction, whereas it is precisely such uncertainty which the [Brussels] Con-
vention is designed to reduce."141 The Court seemed to overlook that
their own uniform interpretation of this provision was the only remedy to
their declared predicament. In other words, the only way to keep the
characteristic performance test from creating uncertainty is for the E.CJ.
to interpret the test in a consistent and uniform manner, thereby provid-
ing the stability and certainty which the provision itself lacks. The Court
in this case resorted to a national conflicts rule for its result instead of
relying on the guidelines provided by the Brussels Convention provision.
Because the characteristic performance test is fundamental to the Rome
Convention, one can extrapolate that the same reasoning used by the
E.C.J. in this case could also be applied to the characteristic performance
test in article 4, and to other indeterminate Rome Convention
provisions.142
D. Status Quo
The Rome Convention is often compared to, and is said to have been
influenced by, the United States Restatement of Conflict of Laws.' 43 The
purpose of a Restatement is not to suggest prospective rules that might
make a particular system better or more efficient; rather, a Restatement
attempts to state precedent in a condensed form. The Convention, like
the U.S. Restatement, is fundamentally an excessively simplified compila-
tion of the status quo of European Community conflict of laws rules.
The Convention admittedly contains some changes in a number of
Member States' conflict laws. However, where changes have occurred, the
138. The Maastricht Treaty is indicative of an E.G. proposal which faced intense
opposition. Denmark rejected the original treaty, and other E.C. countries have indi-
cated their resistance to enter into restrictive agreements. See Alan Riding, European
Chiefs Stem Threats to Unity, N.Y. Trmas, Dec. 13, 1992, at A26. Other ancillary problems,
such as economic recession and the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have also contrib-
uted to a general European Community aversion to expedited unity. See Alan Riding,
Europeans Tiy to Revive a Faded Dream of Unity, N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1993, at A8.
139. Case 266/85, Shenavai v. Kreischer, 1987 E.C.R. 239, 3 C.M.L.R. 782 (1987).
140. Brussels Convention, supra note 11.
141. Shenava4 1987 E.C.R. at 256, 3 C.M.L.R. at 792.
142. ProfessorJayme considered this case to be a major turning point for European
conflicts law. Prior to this case, he believed that the Rome and Brussels Conventions
would form the core of European conflicts law. Jayme, supra note 13, at 39.
143. Juenger, supra note 103, at 131.
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Convention's nebulous construction often allows forum judges to retain
the status quo of the particular State's conflict laws without breaching the
provisions of the Convention.
Article 's proviso on party autonomy' 44 exemplifies a rule that does
not change the current legal standard of any Member State. Prior to the
Convention, every Member State allowed contractual parties to specify the
law they desired to govern the contract. Most experts agree that party
autonomy "belongs to the common core of... legal systems," 145 a fact that
even the official Convention Report acknowledges. 14 6 One might counter
that although the concept behind article 3 is not original, the amount of
freedom the article allows the parties is. For example, article 3 does not
require a correlation or a reasonable relationship' 4 7 between the law cho-
sen and the contract, as many Community countries do. But this argu-
ment fails in the real world. Common legal practice shows that parties do
not assign meaningless choice of law clauses to govern their contractual
relationships.' 48
The Restatement analogy works well for the Convention. Like the
Restatement, much of the Convention only codifies what already exists.
Additionally, the Convention, like the Restatement, attempts to unify the
law, but both are powerless to do so: the Restatement because it lacks
statutory codification, and the Convention because it lacks a uniform,
autonomous interpreting body.
IV. The German Paradigm
A. Germany and the European Community
The ultimate effect of the Rome Convention will not be determined for
many years. Article 17 prohibits retrospective application of the Conven-
tion.149 Thus, in most Member States, the Convention will apply only to
contracts formed after April 1, 1991, the day the Convention was enacted.
Consequently, litigation involving Convention articles will not reach the
Member States' high courts for quite some time. Even the effects of the
1968 Brussels Convention' 5 0 are still being determined today. 15 1 Never-
theless, by using the German incorporation of the Convention as a para-
digm, it is possible to reliably predict the Convention's impact on the
European Community without awaiting results.
144. Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
145. Lando, supra note 61, at 169.
146. Convention Report, supra note 14, at 6.
147. See supra text accompanying note 31.
148. Paul Lagarde, The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions: An Apologia, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 91, 96 (1981).
149. Article 17 states: "This Convention shall apply in a Contracting State to contacts
made after the date on which this Convention has entered into force with respect to
that State." Rome Convention, supra note 1.
150. Brussels Convention, supra note 11.
151. See, e.g., Fentiman, supra note 26.
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Four Community members, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and
Germany, chose to enact the Rome Convention before the seven state rati-
fication requirement was fulfilled.15 2 Although the Convention was
enacted, in the case of Denmark, as early as July 1, 1984,153 it remains
relatively recent law because it only applies to contracts formed after ratifi-
cation. Consequently, only a small number of meaningful decisions cur-
rently exist upon which to judge its effects.
Of the four implementing countries, Germany has by far the largest
economy.15 4 * Germany is also widely recognized as one of the world's larg-
est traders.' 55 Accordingly, German citizens and corporations are
involved in an extensive amount of international contracts. The German
courts, consequently, must adjudicate a fair amount of disputes arising out
of these contracts. Germany, therefore, is a fertile testing ground for the
effects of Rome Convention provisions.
Due to its economic power, Germany wields substantial influence
both in the international arena 15 6 and the European Community.15 7 The
effects of any E.C. agreement or legislation in Germany are thus critical to
the legislation's ultimate success or failure. Also, Germany's interpreta-
tion of the Rome Convention will greatly effect the Convention's ultimate
effectiveness. Thus, the outcome of the Rome Convention in Germany
can serve as a useful paradigm or microcosm of the eventual consequences
of the Convention in the European Community.
B. Rulings
German rulings that directly interpret Convention provisions are still rela-
tively scant. Yet, although few in number, these decisions exhibit the con-
sequences of Convention deficiencies. These rulings demonstrate the
unpredictability and indeterminacy of many Convention provisions and
their consequent inconsistent or incorrect application. These rulings also
illustrate the self-defeating construction of many Convention articles. 158
1. The Steel Wool Case
Some of the difficulties accompanying vague Convention provisions, in
this case article 4,159 were illustrated in a decision of the Dortmund Lan-
152. Junker, supra note 69, at 676; Plender, supra note 84, at 24-25.
153. Loy. nr. 188 at 9. maj, LovrirNE 635 (1984).
154. Germany has the third largest economy in the world, trailing only the United
States and Japan. FACrs ABour GmuE.RAw 160 (Karl R6mer et al. eds., 1989).
155. Id. at 211.
156. The German Bundesbank is frequently petitioned to cut interest rates to help
weaker European currencies and the European economy. See Diane Dimond,
Bundesbank is Back in the Spotlight as Pressure for Interest Rate Cut Mounts, WALL ST. J., Sept.
7, 1993, at C15.
157. This is partially due to the significant amount of monetary support which Ger-
many contributes to the E.E.C. and its programs. FAars ABoUT GmaAw, supra note
154, at 135, 220.
158. Critics predicted this flaw, and German courts have subsequently proven them
right. See PL.ma,, supra note 84.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 100-06,
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dgericht.' 60 The case involved a contract between plaintiff, a German
steel wool manufacturer, and defendant, a Dutch scouring sponge manu-
facturer. Plaintiff agreed to buy sponges exclusively from defendant and
sell them in Germany. Defendant agreed, in turn, to distribute plaintiff's
steel wool pads under an exclusive agreement. Plaintiff claimed breach of
contract by defendant and sought a remedy before the court.
A major point addressed by the court was the ascertainment of appli-
cable law.16 1 The court first referred to article 27 of the Introductory Law
of the German Civil Code (E.G.B.G.B.), the German codification of the
Rome Convention's article 3.162 Finding that the parties had not chosen
an applicable law, the court then turned to article 28, Germany's codifica-
tion of article 4.163 Article 28 directs a court to apply the law of the coun-
try with which it is most closely connected.'6 In finding this close
connection, a court is instructed to look to the party effecting the charac-
teristic performance of the contract and apply the law of that party's habit-
ual residence.16 5
In its examination of the contract, the court established that both par-
ties affected the characteristic performance equally.' 66 The analysis
promulgated by the Convention standard thus revealed that neither party,
and consequently neither Holland nor Germany, had a closer connection
to the contract. Faced with this dilemma, the court determined not to
apply d~perage, the ostensibly diplomatic approach; such a strategy would
have allowed both German and Dutch law to govern the portions of con-
tract performed in their respective countries. Instead, the court reverted
to the traditional method of counting relevant factors to determine
proper law.167 Important considerations in the court's determination of
proper law were the place and language of the contract. Because the con-
tract was concluded in Germany and drafted in the German language, the
court naturally concluded that German law should govern the contract. 168
This case exhibits the unpredictable, and consequently unreliable,
results of inexplicit Convention provisions. Without the confines of defini-
tive guidelines, the German court in this case simply reverted back to its
outmoded and manipulable "counting contacts" standard,16 9 thus main-
taining the German conflict of laws status quo.
2. The Lankya Abhaya Case
The German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), in one of its first deci-
160. LG Dortmund, Apr. 8, 1988, 9 IPRAx 51 (1989).
161. Id.
162. Rome Convention, supra note 1.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. I&
166. LG Dortmund, Apr. 8, 1988, 9 IPRAx 51 (1989).
167. See supra text accompanying note 105.
168. LG Dortmund, Apr. 8, 1988, 9 IPRAx 51, 52 (1989).
169. This result, reverting back to counting relevant factors, confirms the prediction
made by some experts. See Delaume, supra note 81, at 109.
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sions applying the newly incorporated Convention, 70 illustrated the bene-
fits of specificity in Convention provisions while also demonstrating the
articles' vulnerability to arbitrary application. The plaintiff in the case had
insured the carriage of a consignment of carpets from Bombay, India to
the recipient in Hamburg, Germany with the insurer "Lankya Abhaya."'
71
Upon delivery, it was discovered that a number of the carpets were severely
damaged. Plaintiff remunerated the recipient and subsequently sought
reimbursement from the carrier. The Sri Lankan carrier relied on a
choice of law clause, contained in the bill of lading, designating Sri
Lankan law and courts as governing. Plaintiff contended that the clause
was invalid because it was illegible.
The Court referred to the newly enacted article 31(1) of the
E.G.B.G.B., Germany's incorporation of Convention article 8(1),172 and
directed the lower court to determine the validity of the clause by refer-
ring to the law that would apply if the clause were valid. 173 In other words,
the lower court was to determine the state of Sri Lankan law on enforcing
clauses in small print, alleged to be illegible. This determination would
govern the validity of the choice of law clause.
This case appears to be a straightforward application of an explicit
Convention provision. The Court apparently had no other option than to
apply Sri Lankan law because to do otherwise would have directly violated
the German Code. Indeed, this case marked a divergence from previous
German decisions.174 But the cut-and-dried appearance of this case is
deceiving. In its analysis, the Court conspicuously ignored article 31(2),
the German version of article 8(2), despite its clear application to the facts
of the case.
Article 8(2) reads:
Nevertheless a party may rely upon the law of the country in which he has
his habitual residence to establish that he did not consent if it appears from
the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of
his conduct in accordance with the law specified in the preceding
paragraph.175
The plaintiff in this case seemed to be arguing the very substance of article
8(2); since the choice-of-law clause-and consequently the choice of Sri
170. BGH Dec. 15, 1986, 8 IPRAx 26 (1988).
171. Id.
172. See supra text accompanying note 48.
173. BGH Dec. 15, 1986, 8 IPRAx 26, 27 (1988).
174. German courts had formerly applied German standards to foreign provisions
instead of looking to the foreign forum, in this case Sri Lanka, for its standard of inter-
pretation. Since German law invalidates illegible contract clauses, a German court not
relying on the Convention would automatically have invalidated the Sri Lankan choice
of law clause without any reference to Sri Lankan law on the matter. Since the Rome
Convention governed this clause, however, the German court was directed to Sri
Lankan law before a determination could be made. Jfirgen Basedow, Das Statut der
Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung nach derIPR-Reform, 8 IPRAx 15, 16 (1988). While not bound
by stare decisis, German courts are nevertheless influenced by precedent. Id.
175. Rome Convention, supra note 1.
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Lankan law-was illegible, there was no meeting of the minds and no con-
sent to Sri Lankan law. To determine the party's conduct in accordance
with Sri Lankan law would not be reasonable and, therefore, the law of the
plaintiff's habitual residence should apply to determine whether or not
there was consent to Sri Lankan law. Yet the Bundesgerichtshofinexplica-
bly overlooked article 8(2) in its analysis.
The structure of article 8 is characteristic of many Convention provi-
sions; flexibility and policy concerns undermine the article's certainty and
predictability.176 This case is symptomatic of the problems which arise as
a result of these provisions. The Bundesgerichtshof arbitrarily applied
one article provision and completely ignored the other. A primary reason
for establishing uniform rules is to obtain uniform results. With standards
such as the amorphous "if it appears from the circumstances that it would
not be reasonable"17 clause in article 8(2) guiding judges, the Conven-
tion will continually produce such unpredictable results as the Lankya
Abhaya case.
3. German-Italian Cases
German courts have also shown how the Rome Convention undermines its
stated goals with its own provisions. In three separate cases, one decided
in the Munich Landgericht, 178 another in the Stuttgart Landgericht,179
and the third in the Frankfurt am Main Arbeitsgericht,180 each German
court individually preferenced a separate international Convention over
the provisions of the Rome Convention. Each of these cases involved a
sales contract between German and Italian parties. The courts in each
case utilized the guidelines in article 28, the German codification of Con-
vention article 4, and in each case Italian law was found applicable because
of its "closest connection" to the contract.
But the analysis did not stop there. The courts subsequently referred
to the 1980 Vienna Sale of Goods Convention,18 1 an agreement to which
both Italy and Germany are parties. They determined that the Vienna
Convention should apply because, according to article 21,182 the Rome
Convention does not prejudice the application of international conven-
tions to which a contracting State is or becomes a party.'8 3 The Vienna
Convention' 8 4 consequently neutralized the effects of Italian law on the
176. See supra text accompanying note 87.
177. Rome Convention, supra note 1.
178. LG Mfinchen, July, 7, 1989, 10 IPRAx 316 (1990).
179. LG Stuttgart, Aug. 31, 1989, 9 IPRAx 317 (1989).
180. AG Frankfurt am Main, Jan. 31, 1991, 11 IPRAx 345 (1991).
181. United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980) reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
182. See supra text accompanying note 82.
183. See supra text accompanying note 82.
184. For a general discussion of the Vienna Convention, see JoHN HoN'Noi, Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE 1980 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989); Sympo-
sium" Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1988); Muna
Ndulo, The ienna Sales Convention 1980 and the Hague Uniform Laws on International Sale
of Goods.: A Comparative Analysis, 38 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1 (1989).
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contract by referring the German courts back to the law of their forum, or
in these cases, to the provisions of the Vienna Sale of Goods Convention.
The application of the Vienna Convention is not necessarily wrong or even
undesirable; nevertheless, it is unclear that, according to Italian law,
employing the Vienna Convention was the appropriate solution.18 5
Article 21 encourages this form of judicial activism by automatically
preferencing other conventions over the Rome Convention, regardless of
their nature, scope, or credibility. The goals of the Rome Convention
would be better served if a court were, at a minimum, compelled to weigh
additional factors when applying overlapping conventions. For example,
the Convention could add a provision, similar to article 18,186 requiring
courts to balance the goals of the Rome Convention against those of the
competing convention before determining which one should govern. l8 7
4. The Spanish Consumer Contract Case
Indeterminate and flexible provisions also frustrate the goals of the Rome
Convention. In a 1989 decision of the Frankfurt Oberlandesgerict,18 8 the
court refused to apply a Spanish choice of law clause to a consumer con-
tract because it violated the consumer protection clause in article 29 (1) (2)
of the E.G.B.G.B., the German codification of Convention article 5(2).
The court, demonstrating the ease with which precise provisions are
applied, was not forced to rely on article 6, the German public policy pro-
vision.' 8 9 Although the court's reasoning and conclusions were relatively
straightforward, a subsequent case commentary' 90 by Professor Alexander
Lideritz inadvertently demonstrated the deficiencies of Convention arti-
cle 18, the provision charging Member States to interpret Convention arti-
cles with an eye to uniformity.19 '
In an observation on the court's interpretation of E.G.B.G.B. article
29(1) (Convention article 5(2)),192 Professor Lfideritz proposed a manip-
ulation of E.G.B.G.B. article 36 (Convention article 18). At the time of the
Lfideritz commentary, the Convention had not yet been enacted in the
entire Community. Professor Lideritz therefore suggested that German
courts had a duty to interpret Convention provisions, including article
29(1) and article 7, in a manner acceptable to future German courts. 193
185. Gert Reinhart, Zum Inkraftten des UN-Kaufrechtsfflr die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land-Ente Entscheidungen deutscher Gerichte, 10 IPRAx 289, 292 (1990).
186. See supra text accompanying note 56.
187. For a general discussion of the problems of overlap in international agreements
and the difficulties accompanying cases which both agreements wish to govern, see Erik
Jayme & Christian Kohler, Das Internationale Privat- und Verfahrensrecht der EG- Stand
1989, 9 IPRAx 337, 344 (1989).
188. OLG Frankfurt, June 1, 1989, 10 IPRAx 236 (1990).
189. The lower court incorrectly applied article 6. AG Lichtenfels, May 24, 1989, 10
IPRAx 235 (1990).
190. Alexander Lfideritz, Internationaler Verbraucherschutz in Nten, 10 IPRAx 216
(1990).
191. See supra text accompanying note 56.
192. See supra note 44.
193. Laideritz, supra note 190, at 219.
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Because article 18 calls for a uniform interpretation of the Convention,
Lfideritz reasoned, other Member countries would be compelled to
adhere to Germany's existing interpretation upon enactment of the Con-
vention in the Community.' 94 In other words, Lfideritz believed that the
initial interpretation of a Convention provision, regardless of the forum,
should stand as stare decisis for other Member States.
Professor Laideritz illustrates how easily one State's avaricious motives
can undermine the overall purposes of the Convention. His analysis also
demonstrates the ease with which vague Convention provisions may be
manipulated. Liideritz equates uniform rules with reliance on precedent;
the method of decision and validity of reasoning are secondary to the
importance of being the first State to decide an issue. Lfideritz's reason-
ing thus transforms article 18, a provision originally intended to produce
uniform results, into a self-serving "race to interpret."
Lideritz, however, forgets that article 18, like other Convention arti-
cles, has no power of enforcement.1 95 It is doubtful that Member States
will adhere to a precedent they oppose simply because another Member
State resolved the issue first. Indeed, the Lfideritz approach would proba-
bly have the opposite effect: States would be more inclined to ignore pre-
cedent for the sake of uniformity if they felt that the process had been
manipulated. Such an approach would undoubtedly lead to an acceler-
ated collapse of the Convention. Instead of one uniform standard, this
approach could result in twelve separate Conventions: a different interpre-
tation and standard for each Member State.
These illustrations from the German courts are far from comprehen-
sive. Nevertheless, they expose some major weaknesses of the Rome Con-
vention and indicate what may lie ahead for the European Community.
Those wishing to salvage the Rome Convention from eventual collapse
would be wise to heed the warning signals of the German paradigm.
V. Recommendations
Some prominent commentators believe that the European Community
should, and eventually will, eliminate efforts to unify conflict of laws rules
and concentrate instead on unifying substantive laws.196 This approach
was successfully implemented with E.C. products liability law.' 97 This suc-
cess, coupled with the difficulties encountered in the establishment of the
Rome Convention, seems to support the proposition that substantive uni-
formity should be both a present and an ultimate goal of the European
194. Id.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
196. See Ole Lando, European Contract Law, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 653 (1983); HEN
Kiaz, GnEinmauRaopAmscHs ZwnxucHT 481 (Festschrift Zweigert, Tfibingen 1981).
197. See generally Gregory G. Scott, Products Liability Laws in the European Community in
1992, 18 WM. Mrrcr.LL L. REv. 357 (1992); Michael R. Will, Asides on the Nonharmoniza-
tion of Products Liability Laws in Europe, in HARMONIZATION OF LAWS iN THE EuRoPEAN
COMMUNmES: PRODUCTs LABILTy, CONFLICT OF LAws, AND CORPORATION LAw [Fifth
Sokol Colloquium] (P. Herzog ed., 1983).
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Community. 198 Recent events,199 however, indicate an increasing reluc-
tance to enter into agreements that relinquish State sovereignty. The like-
lihood of such a transformation in the near future is consequently more
unlikely now than at any time in the recent past.
Although substantive changes should be a long-term goal of the Com-
munity, temporary steps can increase the Rome Convention's effectiveness
in the interim. What steps will further this goal? The short answer is that
no one can be certain. Past experience, however, provides some sugges-
tions for refinement of the Rome Convention and for future attempts at
such agreements.
First, the drafters need to work towards greater specificity within a
smaller scope. A number of experts agree: "The road to progress.., lies
in a pragmatic approach that focuses attention... on specific contracts
within a given category."200 The Convention attempts to accomplish too
much and gives only general guidance on achieving its ends. The Conven-
tion could be broken up into sub-groups where specific rules would be
formulated for specific areas. Exceptions would be specific and allowed
only in rare circumstances. A number of international conventions have
achieved impressive results through such an approach.201
Second, a unified judicial body must have exclusive jurisdiction over
interpretation of the Convention. As a German commentator observed:
"[T]ruly uniform interpretation will be achieved only after the European
Court [ofJustice] is given jurisdiction to interpret the Convention on Con-
tractual Obligations."202 The Community is currently attempting to
achieve this end by assigning unitary jurisdiction to the E.CJ. through a
series of protocols.20 The effectiveness of these protocols is frequently
questioned,204 however, and their ultimate success depends on Member
States' willingness to yield a portion of their sovereignty. If unwillingness
prevails, other alternative measures must be considered.
One such alternative is the formation of a separate commercial court.
Much criticism of the E.CJ. is directed towards its composition. Critics
point out that the E.CJ. is comprised of academics and constitutional law-
yers who, though knowledgeable, are frequently incognizant of commer-
cial realities. The formation of a separate commercial court might provide
an intermediate solution to this problem. Such a court would ideally be
composed of members with previous experience in the commercial com-
munity, much like the Commercial Courts in the United Kingdom. States
that traditionally oppose an exclusive E.C.J. jurisdiction, such as the
United Kingdom,205 would certainly be more sympathetic to such an
198. See J.S. Hobhouse, International Conventions and Commercial Law: The Pursuit of
Uniformity, 106 LAw Q. Rxv. 530 (1990).
199. See supra note 138.
200. Delaume, supra note 81, at 120.
201. E.g., supra note 79.
202. Junker, supra note 69, at 696.
203. See supra text accompanying note 129.
204. Mann, supra note 106, at 354. See also supra text accompanying note 139.
205. See Mann, supra note 106, at 354.
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arrangement.
Notwithstanding the number or strength of the proposed remedies or
solutions, their ultimate effectiveness will depend on the willingness of
Member States to submit to the proposed changes. In other words, the
Rome Convention can only be as effective as Member States allow it to be.
Conclusion
The Rome Convention is an inconsistent and flawed agreement. Discre-
tionary provisions prevent the Convention from achieving its intended
purpose: to establish uniform conflict of laws rules in the European Com-
munity. The German paradigm forecasts the demise of the present Rome
Convention by illustrating the practical consequences of these flawed
provisions.
Material changes could alter the Convention's fate despite the dismal
outlook. If Community courts were constrained by precise rules with strict
exceptions, certainty and uniformity would undoubtedly result. Granting
the E.CJ. unitary jurisdiction to interpret the Convention would also fur-
ther the goal of uniform Community laws. Unless the needed changes
occur, however, the Rome Convention will cease to have any practical sig-
nificance in the European Community. If, on the other hand, fundamen-
tal changes are made, the Rome Convention can serve as a stepping stone
to additional Community agreements and further European unity.

